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payment of debt 
less costly or by
raising default costs.
G
reece, which shook international markets with the disclosure 
of  its  deep  indebtedness,  has  struggled  recently  to  borrow 
money. Among European governments, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
have also had difficulty selling bonds. 
Even  though  these  governments  probably  have  assets  that  exceed 
their debts, investors worry about the risk of default. This belief stems 
in  part  from  the  nature  of  sovereign  debt.  Governments  aren’t  subject 
to formal bankruptcy regulations, leaving investors few legal rights over 
borrower assets, even if they could be liquidated. Consequently, the likeli-
hood of default is not strictly determined by measures of solvency or asset 
liquidity—traditional indicators of a borrower’s financial health. Rather, it’s 
a matter of the political willingness to repay creditors. 
A perceived high likelihood of default increases interest rates on the 
new debt necessary to finance deficits and payments on outstanding obli-
gations. Policymakers in Europe have taken measures that include subsi-
dized loans to support the troubled governments’ finances. Whether such 
policies prevent default ultimately depends on whether they effectively 
boost incentives for repayment.
 
Rising Greek Deficits
Concerns  over  some  European  governments’  debt  levels  escalated 
with Greece’s disclosure late last year that its budget deficit was much 
higher than previously thought. In November, the newly elected govern-
ment revealed a deficit of 12.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), 
more than twice the previous estimate of 6.1 percent. A further revision 
came in April from Eurostat, the European Union’s statistical agency, which 
put the deficit at 13.6 percent of GDP. In the meantime, other countries 
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with  high  debt  levels  and  deficits—
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain—felt 
pressured to announce spending-reduc-
tion measures. 
Debt levels in these five countries 
have risen for several years and are 
now higher than at any time since 
formation of the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 
(Chart 1). Greece and Italy each owed 
amounts equal to about 115 percent of 
GDP at the end of 2009, with Portugal 
at 77 percent, Ireland at 64 percent 
and Spain at 53 percent. 
Government budget deficits have 
widened as well in recent years (Chart 
2). In addition to Greece’s 13.6 percent 
shortfall, 2009 deficits as a percentage 
of GDP were 14.3 percent in Ireland, 
11.2 percent in Spain, 9.4 percent 
in Portugal and 5.3 percent in Italy. 
As a point of reference, the criteria 
for admission to the EMU (called the 
Maastricht criteria) mandate that gov-
ernment deficits not exceed 3 percent 
of GDP. 
Looking at the excessive debt lev-
els and budget deficits, it seems intui-
tive to link debt size to the likelihood 
that a government will be able to 
repay: At some point, increasing debt 
must exceed the resources available 
for repayment. However, the link isn’t 
entirely clear. Why did a country such 
as Italy, which has just as much debt 
relative to GDP as Greece, have less 
trouble refinancing what it owes?  
Chart 1 shows that neither country’s 
debt level relative to GDP is unusually 
high, even compared with the recent 
past. Japan had a debt-to-GDP ratio 
exceeding 180 percent in 2009, yet 
interest rates on Japanese government 
debt haven’t risen to reflect a likeli-
hood of default approaching that of 
Greece. 
Lacking Bankruptcy Provisions
These outcomes can be puzzling 
if we think about sovereign debt in 
the same way we do consumer or 
corporate borrowing. Because of the 
structure of individual bankruptcy 
regulations, figuring out a borrower’s 
creditworthiness or likelihood of 
default is a matter of weighing debts 
against assets. In the U.S., a company 
can seek federal court protection 
if it can’t or doesn’t want to repay 
its debts. Chapter 7 bankruptcy, for 
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example, allows owners to discharge 
company debts in exchange for giving 
up the firm’s assets to creditors. In the 
simplest case, the decision to default 
is based on whether it costs more to 
repay debt or relinquish assets. A firm 
whose assets exceed its debts is sol-
vent and will repay its obligations as 
long as it has the liquidity to do so. 
Prospective creditors, therefore, can 
use knowledge of a firm’s finances to 
determine the likelihood of default. 
The sovereign default situation 
is very different because there is no 
legal framework that governs such 
debt and specifies creditor rights.1 
Therefore, a government will repay 
its debt only if it faces negative con-
sequences for defaulting. Those costs 
include the possibility that a govern-
ment will be unable to borrow in 
the future. Argentina, for example, 
defaulted in 2001 and still hasn’t 
fully regained access to international 
financial markets. Other costs may 
include disruption to international 
trade flows because such transactions 
require financing that may be cut off. 
Sovereign debt repayment depends 
more on avoiding these default costs 
and is less linked to solvency per se.
 
Higher Interest Rate Cost
The incentives for governments 
to stay current on what they owe are 
hard to measure, but financial market 
indicators provide a way to gauge 
investors’ perceptions of the willingness 
to repay debt. International investors 
became reluctant to lend to the trou-
bled European governments, especially 
Greece, as indicated by interest rates 
on government borrowing. In particu-
lar, interest rate spreads for these coun-
tries’ debt relative to safer German issu-
ance rose dramatically. Chart 3 shows 
10-year bond spreads—the difference 
between the interest rate on each coun-
try’s 10-year bond minus the rate on 
Germany’s relatively safe 10-year obli-
gations. Movements in these spreads in 
recent months show that international 
investors required a much higher rate 
of return to buy each country’s debt.
Suppose investors can buy a German 
bond at an annual interest rate of 4 
percent with practically no risk, or 
a Greek bond that has a 3 percent 
chance of default. Investors will go 
with the German bond unless the 
Greek government offers an interest 
rate around 7 percent—a spread of 
about 3 percent—to cover the prob-
ability of default. Such a relationship 
can’t be expected to hold exactly in 
the data, but interest rate spreads can 
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still be used to learn about the likeli-
hood of default.2 Chart 3 shows that in 
May 2010, investors’ perceived risk of 
default increased drastically for Greece 
and rose by a lesser degree for the 
other four countries. 
Crafting Aid Packages
In this context, what is an 
effective response to such debt cri-
ses? European policymakers have 
announced various aid measures—
for example, loans at below-market 
interest rates—for Greece and other 
troubled governments. With high debts 
and deficits, these governments must 
continue borrowing to fund expenses 
and make debt payments; wide inter-
est rate spreads make that difficult. 
Policies such as subsidized loans 
make governments feel richer and thus 
more willing to pay debt service than 
face the costs of default. More gener-
ally, policy measures aimed at prevent-
ing sovereign default ultimately need 
to raise incentives to repay debt, either 
by making the payment of debt less 
costly or by raising default costs.3
Ramanarayanan is a senior research economist 
in the Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
1 The features of sovereign debt and default, and 
the conditions that sustain sovereign lending, 
are the focus of a field of research motivated by 
developing economies’ debt crises in the 1980s. 
This section draws on arguments made, for 
example, by Jonathan Eaton, Mark Gersovitz and 
Joseph E. Stiglitz in “The Pure Theory of Country 
Risk,” European Economic Review, vol. 30, no. 3, 
1986, pp. 481–513. 
2 If investors are interested in the expected value 
of their earnings, an interest rate of r satisfying 
0.03 * 0 + 0.97 * (1+r) = 1.04, giving r ≈ 0.07, 
would make them indifferent between lending to 
the Greek government and lending to the German 
government in this example. In reality, there are 
several reasons interest rate spreads are not 
exactly equal to the probability of default. One 
reason is that investors do eventually recover 
some amount of repayment in a default. In this 
case, we would expect interest rate spreads to 
be smaller than the actual probability of default. 
Investors may be concerned not just with the 
expected value of their earnings, but also with the 
risk. In this case, we would expect interest rate 
spreads to be higher than the actual probability of 
default because investors need to be compen-
sated for risk in addition to expected losses. The 
effects of risk and recovery in sovereign debt are 
discussed in “Default and the Maturity Structure 
in Sovereign Bonds,” by Cristina Arellano and 
Ananth Ramanarayanan, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 
Working Paper no. 19, April 2010. 
3 From a more long-term viewpoint, international 
policymakers have long discussed the benefits 
and feasibility of international bankruptcy regula-
tions to make defaults and restructurings of 
sovereign debt more orderly. Anne O. Krueger, 
the former first deputy managing director of the 
International Monetary Fund, presented the case 
for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism 
with features similar to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
in A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructur-
ing, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund, 2002. 